Presence

R. Heinemann Stands By "Sabbath Mode" Ovens

The Yeshiva World recently posted letters from prominent Israeli and American rabbis against the use of "Sabbath Mode" ovens. The letters made reference to an individual opinion that they believed to be erroneous. That opinion, although not explicitly attributed to him, was that of R. Moshe Heinemann of Baltimore's Star-K.

Today, the Star-K sent out an email stating that R. Heinemann stands by his ruling:

June 5, 2008

Regarding Star-K certified Sabbath Mode ovens

Rav Heinemann, shlita, stands by his Psak that it is permissible to raise and lower temperatures on Yom Tov on ovens equipped with that particular Sabbath Mode feature. Please see Star-K website at http://www.star-k.org/consumer.htm , or call our office for details about your particular model. Star-K will, in the next few days, post an audio presentation from Rav Heinemann explaining his views.

For those who wish to refrain from placing their ovens in Sabbath Mode and still use their oven on Yom Tov, please be aware of the possible serious "Michshol" on many models. Opening the oven door will immediately shut off the heating elements, an act clearly forbidden on Yom Tov. Thus, even if you don't raise or lower the temperature, it is still important to keep the oven in Sabbath Mode.

Star-K Certification

Below is R. Heinemann's original teshuva on Sabbath Mode ovens, which can also be found on the Star-K's website, along with additional information regarding Sabbath Mode appliances:

This Pretty Much Sums Up Judaism

Q. Did Hillel really make a sandwich in the times of the Beit ha-Mikdash?

A. No. Otherwise a ‘sandwich’ would be called a ‘hillel’ since he predated the famed Earl by over a millennium. Seriously, though, Hillel had it right. He wrapped (‘korech’) his matza around some marror and some korban Pesach. Clearly, his matza was soft and flexible. The Mishna’s marror was lettuce. Thus, he basically took a lafa and put on some lettuce and roast lamb, wrapped it up, and chowed down. We commemorate this by eating horseradish on a cracker and saying “This is what Hillel did”, on the very night that we ostensibly preserve and transmit our collective memory.

From AddeRabbi’s Pesach FAQ.

I Want To See This Movie

The Forward, Haredi Life, Too Purely Rendered, reviews the film My Father, My Lord (in Hebrew, "Hofshat Kayitz").

It's not available on Netflix; if anyone in Israel knows where to get this on DVD, please get in touch.

Hasidic Jews in House

On last week's episode of House, patient of the week was a woman who became suddenly ill at her wedding. The catch: the patient was "a music producer living in the fast lane until she converted to Hasidic Judaism."

I'd heard much about this episode, but hadn't seen it when it aired; it recently became available online and I got a chance to watch it.

House is insistent that people don't change. He is adamant that the woman's religious renewal is related to her illness. House characterizes religion as both mental illness and masochism before it is revealed that, in fact, the woman's illness was unrelated to her choice to become Orthodox. Throughout the episode, there is a parallel between House's diagnosis of the woman's illness, and his argument with Wilson regarding his girlfriend (known on the show as CTB). At the end of the episode, House consents to Wilson dating CTB, even though it will damage their friendship. Wilson accuses House of changing, but House continues to insist that people don't change.

I think House's point is: people don't change; we may make changes, sometimes even drastic ones, to our lives and lifestyles, but those changes are often only superficial, done in service to something deeper in our psyche that is unchangeable. The woman's illness, although unrelated to her religious changes, doesn't indicate that people do change. Becoming Orthodox, for her, was simply following the same inner compulsion that she had been following her whole life. Although her life may seem drastically different to the casual observer, when looked at as a whole, her entire life's actions would fit into a single context. This is also illustrated by the Dr. Taub, who left a career as a plastic surgeon to become House's intern; although a drastic change in career, the change was preserve his marriage, to prevent change. House's change of heart for Wilson is simply based on the fact that he now feels that the relationship is good for his friend.

On note of trivia: the actress who plays the patient of the week is Laura Silverman, sister of comedienne Sarah Silverman.

Respect Your Elders

Baltimore expat Elliott Cahan has an article on Arutz Sheva entitled Identity Crisis, on the state of senior care in Israel. Quite an eye-opening article, and proof that a big opportunity exists in providing decent elder care in Israel.

Hanukkah for the Little People

Came across this today on Amazon: Fisher Price Little People Hanukkah Set.

If you're not Jewish, don't feel left out; you can always pick up the Little People: A Christmas Story:

Presence Poll: I Believe that the Universe...

Note: Unlike comments on this blog, I have no way of seeing your answer and correlating that to any kind of identifiable information. In other words, I can't see who is voting for what.

Pshat and Drash in Vayera

Adderabbi posts about the Rashbam's interpretation of the beginning of parshas Vayera. My son and I were learning this a few weeks back, as he is learning Vayera in school, and picked up on the ambiguity of the psukim, and came up with this explanation on his own (despite the fact that he had been taught the medrash's explanation as pshat in school). As Adderabbi points out, the beginning of the parsha could really go either way, and is probably more in line with the Rashbam's explanation. The ending (Gen. 18:22), however, fits better with the midrashic explanation: "And the men turned from thence, and went toward Sodom; but Abraham stood yet before the LORD." I do see how this fits even according to Rashbam; the fact that God says "I will go down" and then the two "men" go would seem to indicate that the two men are representative of "God" in this case. But, if you had to read it straight, the beginning of the perek works best according to the Rashbam, while the end works best according to the midrashic explanation.

I find this often to be the case where a midrashic explanation deviates from the pshat; that there is compelling evidence on both sides of the equation. As a rule, we seem to favor the midrashic explanation over pshat, mostly, I think, because of Rashi's prominence and because it allows more doctrinal flexibility.

A commentor over on Adderabbi's blog brings up the concept of header verses; verses that act as a description, or header, of what is to come. There are many examples of these in pshat, that are glossed over via midrash. A good example is Genesis 1:1; according to the pshat, this is a header describing what takes place over the next few days. We have come to interpret it differently due to a combination of reasons, some midrashic, some epistemological.

Hobbes and the Jews

Philosophy Bites' latest podcast interviews Quentin Skinner on Hobbes' view of the State. It's really interesting. I'm not really as adept a student of philosophy as I'd like, but it seems like Hobbes was, more or less, attempting to transition what had been traditionally a theological system of government into a humanized system. The idea of the absolute rule of the sovreign is very reminiscent of the narrative of Rosh HaShannah.

On a related note, Hobbes states in Leviathan: "Do not that to another, which thou wouldst not have done to thyself," which is notable as it follows Hillel's, rather than the Gospel's, formulation of the Golden Rule. There's also a book that explores the relationship between Maimonides, Hobbes and Nietzsche. The author is a frum Jew and a student of R. Soloveitchik.

Ann Coulter Does Not Offend Me

I don't see anything wrong with what Ann Coulter said; it's New Testament 101. I certainly don't think she's anti-semitic for saying it. Truth is, I think there's a lot to be learned about the Old Testament from the New Testament; it's basically a critique of Rabbinic Judaism.

It's too bad the host of the show didn't try to have a dialogue with Coulter, instead of just playing the anti-semite card, it could have been interesting.

The Narrative of the Days of Judgement and Atonement

In the beginning, Man rejects Divine authority in favor of his own reason and autonomy. This leads to all sorts of problems for Man, most of which involve other people being unhappy. At some point, a small group of Men, related by blood and recently emancipated from the tyrannical authority of an oppressive despot, subjugate themselves (not completely willingly) to Divine authority and accept upon themselves to abide by God's Law. This goes somewhat well, but, as with most things, there's a few bumps along the way; what becomes clear is that Man is locked in a constant battle, between obedience to a higher power and asserting himself as an autonomous individual; it is taken as a given that disobedient Man is not good.

As such, once a year (on what is considered the anniversary of the initial rejection of Divine authority), that nation gathers to reestablish their willing subjugation to Divine authority by submitting themselves, their deeds, their legal record, if you will, for judgment before God. As they are inevitably found lacking both on a collective and individual level in some aspect of their adherence and devotion to Divine authority and law, they enter into a plenary period of repentance, culminating in a final day of atonement for their grievances. By doing so they, to some extent, make whole the relationship with the Divine and reaffirm their acceptance of Divine Law. They begin a celebration of communion with their King by dwelling in his house for a period of time, in happiness and free from the concerns brought about by their finite nature.

The Abstinence Song, or Why Chrisitanity is a Religion, and Judaism is a Culture

I've had this in my "to-blog" queue for a while, and figured that this week would be an appropriate time to let it out. I give you: The Abstinence Song.

I'm forwarding this on to the folks at the OU (v'hamvin yavin).

This video comes from a site called GodTube, which is basically YouTube for Christians; it's full of videos all focused on Christianity, with titles like "The Reality of Hell" and "Little Girl and Psalm 23."

On a whim, I typed in JewTube.com, where the top videos are Borat and Lewis Black. Oy vey!

Florida Jewish Charter School Ordered to Halt Hebrew Classes

From JPost, US school ordered to halt Hebrew classes. This is the Jewish Charter school blogged about previously. The article doesn't give a clear reason as to why the Hebrew classes were shut down, just that various outside groups were concerned with the religious character of the curriculum.

I'm guessing that the school was using Bible verses or Mishna text to teach Hebrew (which, by the way, can be pretty effective. I taught myself Hebrew by learning Kehati). Having grown up going to public school, I'm pretty sure I was never asked to read a religious text for English class. Then again, I grew up in very-liberal Maryland; I'm sure there are public schools in the US that still require/incorporate specific religious texts/prayers/etc. into the curriculum or daily life of the schools. Which is a huge double standard.

Hat tip to Uncle Uhvi.

Judaism and Harry Potter

R. Natan Slifkin's article in the Jewish Press, entitled Harry Potter's Fabulous Jewish Monsters examines the biblical, talmudic and midrashic sources for some of the creatures found in the Harry Potter novels.

Apart from Anthony Goldstein (a Ravenclaw, quite appropriately), one has to look carefully to find Judaism at Hogwarts. While much has been written on this subject, most is at the superficial level, using examples from the stories as starting points for discussions of quaint, and often jejune, simplistic Jewish moralisms.

The fundamental question to address is the main theme of the Potter books: that Love is the only force capable of withstanding the Will to Power. Despite the fact that the novels are not evangelical in nature, they are Christian in this respect. Judaism, on the other hand, would posit that Law would be the ideal vehicle through which not only the individual, but also the community, triumphs over the Power of Evil. Rowling is characteristically critical of governments as incapable of effectively combating true Evil. There is an interesting dichotomy between the personal and the communal, which, from my limited understanding, also seems to be a major point of contention between Judaism and Christianity.

Other connections to Judaism include the Philosopher's Stone (Nicholas Flamel's guide in creating the stone was purported to be the Book of Abraham, attributed the patriarch), and the obvious parallels between Nazi Germany and Voldemort's reign of terror.

Zoo Torah in DC

Via the Baltimore Achdus mailing list:

Join a Torah Tour of the National Zoo in Washington DC, led by the famous "Zoo Rabbi," Natan Slifkin! The tour will take place on Sunday, July 22nd, from 2pm to 5pm. It is aimed at adults and older kids, but all ages are welcome. The cost of the tour is $18 for adults and $12 for children. Advance registration is essential as group spaces are limited. If you would like to join the afternoon tour, please email zoorabbi@zootorah. com with the number of people in your group and a contact cellphone number, and you will be sent details of exactly where to meet.

The Imaginary Jew and the Unimagined Jew

Michael Chabon's new novel The Yiddish Policemen's Union, which takes place in a fictionalized present in which the State of Israel never was, the Jews instead living in a giant ghetto in Alaska, has sparked some interesting commentary regarding the contemporary Jewish experience. In an article in The Nation entitled The Imaginary Jew, William Deresiewicz writes:

But over the past three decades, the dense particularity of American Jewish life has, outside the Orthodox community, largely disappeared. No one speaks Yiddish anymore, or even English that sounds like Yiddish. There may be suburbs with a lot of Jews, but there are no Jewish suburbs as there were once Jewish neighborhoods. With Jews as senators and governors and Ivy League presidents, the wounding, binding sense of exclusion has melted away. Communal institutions remain strong, traditions are still cherished, but American Jewish experience is now, by and large, simply American experience. Jewish mothers don't say "Ess, ess" anymore; they say, "Do you want me to call Sophia's mom to make a playdate?"

While there are young Jewish writers aplenty, no important voice has emerged to speak about contemporary Jewish life. Jonathan Lethem's The Fortress of Solitude, perhaps the finest recent novel by a young Jewish writer, is not about being Jewish at all; it's about the quintessentially American subject of race. But there have always been Jewish writers who have chosen to speak about things other than being Jewish (most notably, in the Bellow-Roth generation, Norman Mailer and J.D. Salinger). What's really telling about the current state of Jewish fiction is that even those prominent young writers who do speak about Jewish experience don't speak about contemporary experience.

It's true; "Jewish" fiction is either about the past (mostly the Holocaust), or the early struggles of Jews in America. There is hardly anything in the contemporary Jewish experience, outside the Orthodox world, that can be called uniquely Jewish.

On the flip side, there remains little to no work within the Jewish community that attempts to understand and reflect on the contemporary Orthodox Jewish experience in America (there likely is some such stuff in Israel, but I'm not familiar with it). There's a lot to be said on this, both on the fact that this kind of literature is not seen as valuable by the community leaders, and the fact that it's not really sought after by the general public.

Conversion and Shavuos

I meant to link to this before Shavuos; better late than never. Last year I wrote an essay entitled: Conversion, Covenant and Commandments: Maimonides on Joining Yisrael. The basic idea is that the acceptance the commandments, according to Maimonides, is not a pre-requisite to conversion, but instead acts as the terms of the deal, so to speak. At last week's Kollel Yom Rishon, I had a chance to speak with R. Zvi Sobolofsky after his shiur on assorted topics in conversion, and he told me that he believes that R. Soloveitchik understood the Rambam that way as well, but the majority of rishonim felt differently.

BHU in Trouble

According to the Jewish Times, Baltimore Hebrew University is in trouble. I can't really comment on the role or affect BHU has on the Baltimore community; all I know is that their library is a great resource and it would be a shame to lose it.

The Connection Between Shmittah and Sinai

I'm sure I'm missing something with Rashi's explanation of the connection between Shmittah and Har Sinai; to me it sounds like polemics. Ramban's explanation is more along the lines of what I was thinking. After the Golden Calf, Moshe had to convince God to continue his association with B'nei Yisrael. He was successful, but it didn't change the fact that, at this point, He would be "dwelling amongst them in the midst of their impurity." In order for this to happen, for God to rest his Presence among the flawed and imperfect community of Man, a system of separation had to be established between the Divine and the profane; this is Vayikra, which introduces the concept of repentance which enables Man to reestablish contact with the Divine, as well as the laws of holiness which delineate the separations, both constant and occasional, required to approach and coexist with the Divine. When this ground work is laid, when the system of barriers is formalized, we can then resume the narrative where we left off at Sinai, with the entrance into the land and related laws.

Sacrifices in the Third Temple and the Secrets of the Guide

In Book 3, Chapter 32 of the Moreh Nevuchim (Friedlander translation available from Wikisource, which will have to suffice until the copyright on Pines' version expires), Maimonides writes:

The Israelites were commanded to devote themselves to His service; comp." and to serve him with all your heart" (ibid. xi. 13):" and you shall serve the Lord your God" (Exod. xxiii. 25);" and ye shall serve him" (Dent. xiii. 5). But the custom which was in those days general among all men, and the general mode of worship in which the Israelites were brought up, consisted in sacrificing animals in those temples which contained certain images, to bow down to those images, and to burn incense before them; religious and ascetic persons were in those days the persons that were devoted to the service in the temples erected to the stars, as has been explained by us. It was in accordance with the wisdom and plan of God, as displayed in the whole Creation, that He did not command us to give up and to discontinue all these manners of service; for to obey such a commandment it would have been contrary to the nature of man, who generally cleaves to that to which he is used; it would in those days have made the same impression as a prophet would make at present if he called us to the service of God and told us in His name, that we should not pray to Him, not fast, not seek His help in time of trouble; that we should serve Him in thought, and not by any action.

For this reason God allowed these kinds of service to continue; He transferred to His service that which had formerly served as a worship of created beings, and of things imaginary and unreal, and commanded us to serve Him in the same manner; viz., to build unto Him a temple; comp." And they shall make unto me a sanctuary" (Exod. xxv. 8): to have the altar erected to His name; comp." An altar of earth thou shalt make unto me" (ibid. XX. 2 1): to offer the sacrifices to Him; comp." If any man of you bring an offering unto the Lord" (Lev. i. 2), to bow down to Him. and to burn incense before Him. He has forbidden to do any of these things to any other being; comp." He who sacrificeth unto any God, save the Lord only, he shall be utterly destroyed * (Exod. xxii. 19):" For thou shalt bow down to no other God" (ibid. xxxiv. 14). He selected priests for the service in the temple; comp." And they shall minister unto me in the priest's office" (ibid. xxviii. 41). He made it obligatory that certain gifts, called the gifts of the Levites and the priests, should be assigned to them for their maintenance while they are engaged in the service of the temple and its sacrifices.

By this Divine plan it was effected that the traces of idolatry were blotted out, and the truly great principle of our faith, the Existence and Unity of God, was firmly established; this result was thus obtained without deterring or confusing the minds of the people by the abolition of the service to which they were accustomed and which alone was familiar to them.

This famous passage is used by some as a proof that Maimonides would not require sacrifices in the third Temple. There's a few problems with this, however. First is that in Laws of Kings, Rambam states that in the Messianic era, there will be a third Temple, and that sacrifices will be offered there. While bringing a proof from the Yad to contradict the Moreh is not necessarily a valid approach, since Maimonides makes a disclaimer that he will intentionally make explicit contradictions with things he has written in his earlier works, and only those with the proper understanding will be able to discern his true opinion, nevertheless, one of Maimonides foundational tenets is that the Law of Moses will not change. As such, it would seem that, although Maimonides feels that the ideal form of worship would not be through sacrifices, since the Law of Moses was implemented in such a fashion, we are tied to that implementation.

Another issue: the logical deduction made from the above passage is that since sacrifices are not the ideal form of worship, then in a future Temple, being that we have now progressed and are accustomed to a more appropriate form of worship, the older, less-than-ideal forms would be put aside. There's just one problem with this logic: the Temple itself is listed as one of those less-than-ideal modes of worship. The question, then, is not whether or not Maimonides would require sacrifices in the third Temple, but whether or not Maimonides felt a third Temple itself would even be historical reality. Granted, in Maimonides depiction of the the Messianic era in the Yad, he leaves open the possibility of there not being a Temple, there's no getting around the fact that from a logical perspective, asking whether or not sacrifices would be extant is a invalid argument.

A final note: if you've heard rumor of the secret opinion of the Guide, of how Maimonides hid his true opinion in statements that seem to coincide with the accepted, common opinion, while in actuality he is covertly communicating an idea that is very much different from, and often at odds with, the norm, the above quoted passage provides a good example of such a "secret" opinion. Read it carefully, and you will learn Maimonides true opinion.

Kashrus at Communal Events

The Washington Jewish Week has a very interesting article about kashrus at communal events (where communal inidcates the entire Jewish community, not just the Orthodox). For the first time, the DCJCC's annual dinner will be "kosher-style," meaning those who adhere to traditional standards of kashrut will likely be enjoying the airplane meal experience. Towards the end of the article, there are quotes from a broad array of rabbis from all denominations; most support traditional kashrus standards at communal events.

Only somewhat ironic, as the function of kashrus is, if not explictly then at least implicitly, to encourage, define and reinforce Jewish community. I once again refer you to R. Meir Soloveitchik's article The Meaning of Kashrut.

[Hat tip: The Jew and the Carrot]

The Positive Value of the Internet in Orthodox Jewish Society

I wanted to post my thoughts on R. Gottlieb's drasha, but I wanted to do it as a separate post, so there would be no confusion as to what I am saying and what R. Gottlieb said. There will be much news that will be coming out over the coming weeks, and I will have to decide if, what and how I want to comment on it. In the mean time, I wanted to offer a concise thought on how and why these changes came about.

My main thought about this is that it shows the positive value of the Internet in contemporary Orthodox society. I firmly believe that the reason this issue is finally being dealt with in a forthright manner by the rabbinate is that they have no choice but to do so. The way information is controlled and disseminated to and within the community has fundamentally changed. This is due in large part to the web in general, and blogs in particular. That is not to say that everything done on the web is done appropriately or in the best possible fashion, but the very existence of the medium, and the fact that information can be published and circulated freely and quickly, has made past approaches to this problem no longer viable. That is not to say that past approaches were correct, either; the existence of the web has enabled a more accurate understanding of the magnitude of the problem to become apparent to those who erred with good intentions and now have the ability to make changes.

Let me make it clear that I do not mean this to be critical of the rabbinate; on the contrary, the fact that they are addressing the issue, rather than not, is responsible and commendable. I do think, however, it is important to recognize the crucial role that the "grass roots" had in bringing about this change.

As a general rule, in any social ecosystem, those in positions of authority by definition maintain the status quo; change must come from the people, and it is the responsibility of those with authority to be sensitive to the needs of the people and judge how to best respond. There is a famous interchange between two poskim that beautifully illustrates this point. The Terumat HaDeshen would often invent theoretical cases to server as the basis for responsum. The Magen Avraham frowned on this practice, arguing that a posek receives special divine guidance when weighing an issue of halachic jurisprudence from an actual real, live person. I don't think it's homiletics to explain this as meaning that halachic decisions are more meaningful when considered in the context of those that practice them, and that the posek must first and foremost respond to the individual.

At any rate, those of us who believe that blogs in particular, and the web in general, have a positive role to play in the Jewish community can count this as a point in our favor.

For more thoughts check out Kefirot's post on the subject.

On Abortion and Tay-Sachs

Via Hirhurim: An article in the YU Commentator by R. Haskel Lookstein recounts an exchange between R. Lookstein and the Rav about aborting a fetus known to have Tay-Sachs:

A particularly poignant exchange between us occurred after I had attended a Rabbinic Alumni convention and heard a very prominent rabbinic scholar discuss the issue of Tay-Sachs testing. That scholar advised against any kind of testing for reasons which he explained. Furthermore, he said, once a woman was pregnant there is certainly no reason to test because even if the fetus were found to have Tay-Sachs disease there is nothing that can be done about it. One may not abort. I was concerned about that approach and, as luck had it, I had been invited to have dinner that evening at the home of a member of the Rav's family at which the Rav was going to be present. He was scarcely in the door when I described to him the view that had been expressed earlier that day and I asked him what his opinion was. He said very firmly: "You can abort a Tay-Sachs fetus through the sixth month." I said nothing but he must have noticed a quizzical look on my face as if to say - which, of course, I would not - what was the basis for the p'sak? I will never forget what he told me. He said: "Chatzkel, did you ever see a Tay-Sachs baby?" I replied that I had not. He said: "We had a Tay-Sachs baby in Boston. I tell you that you can abort a Tay-Sachs fetus through the sixth month." I saw at that moment a gadol in action, deciding a difficult question of Jewish law with absolute confidence and courage, based upon his scholarship and experience.

An Apology for Charedi Orthodoxy

An apt title summarizing R. Adlerstein's weekend as Scholar-in-Residence at Shomrei would be, "An Apology for Charedi Orthodoxy." In two, possibly three, of the five times R. Adlerstein spoke, his focus was defending a fundamentalist viewpoint from criticism.

Friday night, R. Adlerstein spoke about the banning of R. Natan Slifkin's books.

R. Adlerstein was, and remains, one of R. Slifkin's supporters. R. Adlerstein gave a bit of background on how the ban unfolded (the infamous call that R. Slifkin received where he was threated, "You have two hours to recant your position, or you will be put in herem."), and how R. Slifkin sought an audience with any of the rabbis threatening to ban him, and they all refused. R. Adlerstein explained that three basic groups of people were affected by the ban were ba'alei teshuvah, kiruv professionals and anyone else who has an education. R. Adlerstein related that, as a kiruv professional himself, he had considered discontinuing his work, as the conflict between presenting Judaism as not in conflict with scientific or rational thought while at the same time conveying the system of authority inherent to Orthodox Judaism was impossible. R. Adlerstein continued by asking us to appreciate the ban from the perspective of the Charedim. This apology consisted of a critique on the general approach of interpreting Genesis as allegory (due to the potential to slippery-slope taking as allegory other parts of the Torah), as well as a general appeal to unification of the Orthodox world. While R. Adlerstein was adamant that his feeling was that the ban was unfounded on rational, logical and historical levels, he felt that falling into line with the approach outlined by the rabbis in Israel that issued the ban was a more important value than speaking out against the ban.

R. Adlerstein closed by answering questions. I asked how the rabbonim in Israel, who themselves speak either Yiddish or Hebrew, and little English, became aware of a book written in English. R. Adlerstein acknowledged that the rabbis banning the book did not read it, and that this was not an issue that was at all pertinent to their communities. What happened was that two overzealous YU guys read Slifkin's work and started shopping it around in an effort to get it banned. After failing to get any traction in Monsey and Lakewood, they took it to B'nei Brak and Israel and finally found someone that would listen to them. When the ban hit the States, R. Adlerstein explained that many within American Orthodoxy have an axe to grind with the Kaminetsky family, as they felt that R. Yaakov Kaminetsky had long fostered a version of "Charedi-lite" Orthodoxy to which they took issue with. R. Yaakov Kaminetsky was well known to openly teach that Chazal were not infallible and that often their science was wrong. As such, some on the American Orthodox community took this as an opportunity to get back at the Kaminetsky family by supporting the ban. I really don't know all the details here, but it was clear that, whatever went on, decisions to support or oppose the ban were not being made on rational grounds.

So all in all, the talk left me depressed and disheartened at the state of present-day Orthodox Judaism. It doesn't bother me so much that some rabbis in Israel feel that what R. Slifkin wrote is heretical; I suppose they are entitled to their opinion, and certainly have the authority to make statements for those that listen what they have to say. Their statements, however, should not be beyond criticism from others (especially when, in this case, their arguments are certainly assailable on a number of levels). I am also extremely disappointed by the lack of a response by those, both in America and Israel, who have, and continue to believe the opposite to not only be a legitimate approach (both historically and haskafically), but true in an objective sense. R. Adlerstein made a consistent appeal for unity of opinion, that for some reason we are better off all supporting the position espoused by the rabbis in Israel. But why? This seems to me to be a pretty big deal, and if those that believe Judaism isn't still shackled to pre-medieval dogmas aren't willing to take a stand on this issue, what are they willing to take a stand on? There were a few notable exceptions, rabbis who did speak out in support of R. Slifkin, such as R. Tzvi Hersh Weinreb. But by and large, the proclamation by the rabbis in Israel that a significant portion of Orthodox Jewry held heretical beliefs was met with little to no resistance, because people are afraid to stand up for the truth. To me, this is the saddest part of the whole affair.

Shabbos afternoon, R. Adlerstein spoke about the differences between Islam and Judaism. His approach was to take a passage from the Koran or the Hadith which seemed to correspond either to an established Jewish tradition, or a recent Charedi stringency. One example: the Islamic court in Saudi Arabia ruled that a woman is not allowed to drive her dying brother to a hospital if her husband is not accompanying her; apparently, women in Islam are not allowed to drive a car by themselves, as it would promote lewdness. A woman must have her husband present, and therefore, even if someone's life were in danger, she would not be able to drive him to the hospital (I apologize in advance to any Muslims who might read this and find fault with my portrayal of their law; I am relating this from memory as it was explained in a lecture, I have regretfully done no research to verify if this is in fact the case, or even if I am explaining it correctly. I intend no disrespect). Compare this to recent proclamations in Lakewood that woman should not drive their husbands to yeshiva. R. Adlerstein offered a few reasons why, despite almost identical phenomenologies, why Judaism is different (i.e. better), and how we don't really need to worry about the manifestation of what appear to be fanatical, fundamentalist, misogynistic, etc. behaviors in our community, because our system of halacha will prevent things from ever getting too off course.

My response to this is, with all due respect, "bologna." If anything, the Slifkin affair demonstrates the complete opposite to be the case. If those in power are willing to trample over several hundred years worth of Jewish history and thought, and continue to foster an oligarchy that has little to no oversight and zero checks and balances, and is afraid to even criticize itself on the most fundamental of issues...there's nothing that will stop Judaism from backsliding in the same direction.

In summary, and in conclusion, I was extremely disheartened after R. Adlerstein's visit. He painted a bleak picture of contemporary Orthodox Judaism, not so much because specific factions take fundamentalist approaches, but because those factions that have reasonably justified non-fundamental approaches in the past are unwilling to stand up for what they have heretofore supported. I was led to believe that R. Adlerstein would be presenting a controversial approach, but what I got was standard apologetics for the status quo.

Preemptive Justice in the Torah

In the book The Minority Report (The Collected Stories of Philip K. Dick, Vol. 4), by science fiction legend Philip K. Dick (and the subsequent film starring Tom Cruise), future criminals are arrested before they commit a crime. In Dick's future world, new precognition technology allows law enforcement to see into the future and stop a bad guy before he commits a heinous act. The bad guys are locked up without every having committed a crime. I won't spoil the book for you, it's an excellent read, but it does bring up an interesting question: is it just to hold someone morally responsible for a crime he has yet to commit?

The instinctive response is that this is unjust. How can one be convicted of a crime without having done anything? However, in fact, we do already punish some individuals for only thinking or planning on committing a crime; conspiracy to commit murder and reckless driving are some examples where we punish even though nothing happened. In these cases, the behavior exhibited shows that the offender would have committed a greater offense, and so punishment is justified even though nothing was actually done (part of this depends on how you view the function of punishment, but that's a post for another day).

Beyond this, however, a deeper question arises: wouldn't it be possible that, although this person planned on committing a crime, that they would, at the last minute, for some inexplicable reason, decide not to? How can we punish, or hold responsible, someone who might, at the last minute, change their mind?

Of course, this gets into a broader discussion of man's free will, or perhaps his perception of his free will, which is a topic for another time. The question I would like to address here is: what is the Torah's perspective?

I was a bit surprised to find that the Torah, in fact, addresses this topic directly. In Devarim 21:18-21, the Torah states:

18 If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, that will not hearken to the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother, and though they chasten him, will not hearken unto them; 19 then shall his father and his mother lay hold on him, and bring him out unto the elders of his city, and unto the gate of his place; 20 and they shall say unto the elders of his city: 'This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he doth not hearken to our voice; he is a glutton, and a drunkard.' 21 And all the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that he die; so shalt thou put away the evil from the midst of thee; and all Israel shall hear, and fear.

The famous case of the Ben Sorer, the Rebellious Child. The Mishnah goes to great lengths to show that a case of Ben Sorer is extremely unlikely to ever occur; the parameters for qualification are so specific that the Talmud goes so far as to propose that the whole parsha is simply a thought experiment. But what is the thought?

The Mishneh in the eight chapter of Sanhedrin makes this clear:

בן סורר ומורה, יידון על שם סופו--ימות זכאי, ואל ימות חייב: שמיתתן של רשעים--הניה להם, והניה לעולם; ולצדיקים--רע להם, ורע לעולם.

The Rebellious Child is judged by his future deeds; better for him to die in merit, than to die after committing a crime. For death, for evildoers is a benefit to them, and to the world, while death for a righteous individual is bad for them, and bad for the world.

We see that the purpose of the passage of the Ben Sorer is to teach that, in certain circumstances, we are so certain of the future path of a particular individual, we take preemptive action to prevent it from occurring. If we have enough information as to his background, which will inevitable inform his future actions, the Torah tells us that we can, with certainty, take preemptive measures. In the case of the Rebellious Child, those circumstances are so many and specific to the point that they will never happen, but that's not the point; for some people, the Torah feels, their past completely determines their future actions, with no hope of their exercising free will to change it. In this case, it's better to act preemptively than to let the evil transpire.

As further proof that preemptive justice is the point of the parsha of Ben Sorer, take a look at the last two mishnayos in the eighth chapter of Sanhedrin. The penultimate mishnah uses the same language that was previously used to describe the Ben Sorer: "A tunneling burglar is judged by his future deeds." In this case, as the burglar has gone to so much trouble to break into a house, if confronted by the owner, he won't hesitate to commit murder. One is, therefore, allowed to kill a tunneling burglar without fear of reprisal [this case is interesting in that the burglar is destined to commit murder only if he is confronted; so there is a potential that he will not do anything - yet preemptive justice is still sanctioned]. And the final mishnah lists those the cases where one is allowed to kill another person to prevent them from harming another, the classic example of which is the rodef, one who is chasing another person with intent to kill. Again, the example shows the sanction, in this case, of preemptive action to prevent a crime from being committed.

As strange as it may sound, we see that preemptive justice is sanctioned in specific cases by the Torah. When an individual's past, a combination of his biology and experiences, unfold in specific ways, their future actions are certain, beyond the realm of choice. In these cases, the Torah instructs that it is better to prevent the certain future event from taking place, than to allow events to unfold on their own.

Shabbos Reading: Losing Faith

I know this is a week old already, but if you haven't read Losing Faith: How Scholarship Affects Scholars: 2 Who Did and 2 Who Didn’t, print it out and read it over Shabbos. I would relish the opportunity to sit down and talk with any of these men.

[Hat tip: On the Main Line]

Drinking on Purim

R. Gottlieb (and, from what I've heard, other rabbonim as well) came down hard on drinking on Purim. Apparently alcohol abuse is on the rise in the community, and many kids who get tangled up in drugs get the first taste on Purim. I've heard many were upset with what the rabbis were saying (our minyan was all abuzz well after the rabbi's speech), which I think is a good thing. If a rabbi never upsets anyone, he's probably not doing his job.

I had what I thought to be a symbolic explanation for drinking on Purim, but it was based on the existence of a statement I can not find. I had thought that somewhere there was a statement that the extent to which one must become inebriated was formulated in terms of, "until unable to to tell the difference between good and bad." Stranger yet, I specifically remember this being in Aramaic (bein tav l'bish). But I am unable to find this formulation anywhere. I am aware of the formulation in the Talmud Megillah 7b. If anyone knows the source of my perceived formulation, please let me know, I would be much obliged.

Baltimore Jewish Times on Sexual Abuse in the Frum Community

From the February 23, 2007 edition of the Baltimore Jewish Times, an article entitled Today, Steve Is 25:

Steve is from an Orthodox family of eight children. He is no longer observant. Still, he remains close to his parents and siblings. He was a student at a Baltimore-area yeshiva and then a yeshiva high school in the Midwest.

But along the way, everything went so very wrong.

This article is notable as it is the first time the Baltimore Jewish community, perhaps even the entire Baltimore media establishment, has made reference to the Juravel case.

There's a lot to say here. My brief thoughts: There should be no arrogance with being frum. The frum community needs to internalize the fact that, as individuals, each of us are no better, holier or righteous than any other person, be they frum or not, Jew or Gentile. At the same time, it is important to believe that, as a community, if the dictates of our religion are taken seriously, there is a real potential for true goodness and greatness.

I think the article was well done. It confronts a very controversial topic without shying away from the truth but at the same time maintaining a very high level of respect. Kudos to Phil Jacobs.

Rav Documentary Playing Charles Theatre on Sunday

Baltimore Hebrew University is holding a screening of Lonely Man of Faith: The Life and Legacy of R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik this Sunday, February 25th at The Charles Theatre. Although both the film's site and The Charles' website don't specify a time, I've heard it's showing around 2:00PM. Matinees at The Charles are usually $6.

On the Nature of Holidays

ת"ר לפי שראה אדם הראשון יום שמתמעט והולך אמר אוי לי שמא בשביל שסרחתי עולם חשוך בעדי וחוזר לתוהו ובוהו וזו היא מיתה שנקנסה עלי מן השמים עמד וישב ח' ימים בתענית [ובתפלה] כיון שראה תקופת טבת וראה יום שמאריך והולך אמר מנהגו של עולם הוא הלך ועשה שמונה ימים טובים לשנה האחרת עשאן לאלו ולאלו ימים טובים הוא קבעם לשם שמים והם קבעום לשם <עבודת כוכבים> {עבודה זרה}

Our Rabbis taught: When primitive Adam saw the day getting gradually shorter, he said, 'Woe is me, perhaps because I have sinned, the world around me is being darkened and returning to its state of chaos and confusion; this then is the kind of death to which I have been sentenced from Heaven!' So he began keeping an eight days' fast [and prayer vigil - GJG]. But as he observed the winter equinox and noted the day getting increasingly longer, he said, 'This is the world's course', and he set forth to keep an eight days' festivity. In the following year he appointed both as festivals. Now, he fixed them for the sake of Heaven, but the [heathens] appointed them for the sake of idolatry.

The obvious question from this passage (Avodah Zarah 8A) is: if Adam realized that such was the nature of the world, that the shortening of the days was not due to his sin, but instead simply the natural way in which the world operates, why did he feel the need to make a holiday to God? If his motivations would have been idolatrous, it would be understandable, but it is specifically stated that Adam acted "for the sake of Heaven." Why make a holiday simply because one mistook a natural event for an act of God?

Perhaps this helps explain why these holidays, in the end, became associated with idolatry. The fact that their institution was not really in direct correlation to an act of God, but instead in celebration of the natural order of the world, caused later generations to lose sight of their original intent. To Adam, it seemed rational to celebrate those days, since he feared Divine retribution for his sins, and felt he had been given a reprieve, even if in actuality, he had not. But future generations, who did not have this fear, took the holidays as simply a celebration of the natural order, and perverted their original intent to idolatry.

It is interesting to note that whenever we make holidays or special occasions, it is always in confluence with a directly perceived act of God. All major festivals, even those related to the seasons of the year, are associated with some Divine act or revelation. Hallel is recited only on occasions where Divine influence is noticeable (and not when it isn't, i.e. Purim). The reasoning would seem to be so that future generations do not misrepresent the nature of the occasion and turn it towards idolatry (or away from God).

Chemo for Karta

R. Yaakov Menken wants to know what haredim can do to dissassociate themselves from Neturei Karta.

My thoughts: the association comes from the fact that both groups openly embrace fundamentalist doctrines. This is what motivates the outspoken, fundamentalist response, whether it be throwing rocks at cars on Shabbos, rioting over parades or attending a Holocaust conference hosted by the most dangerous man in modern history since Hitler. Until haredim begin to act more reasonably and tone down the fundamentalism, the association will continue, and might even be justified.

Note: one can be religious without being fundamentalist.

Documentary on the Resurgence of Anti-Semitism in the 21st Century

Last night (edit: Monday night), PBS aired a documentary entitled "Anti-Semitism in the 21st Century: The Resurgence." It was quite an interesting show; despite my familiarity with most of the major incidents, such as various prime ministers making public anti-semitic statements, the overall affect of their presentation in documentary form was quite disconcerting and shocking. The NY Times has a review of the program.

Many of the clips shown during the documentary were from MEMRI.org and MEMRITV.org. Search MEMRITV.org for al shatat, the name of a documentary in which a dying Baron Rothchild discusses the Jewish conspiracy to take over the world, and Hasidim kidnap and slaughter a Christian child in order to obtain blood for their matzah. Or read this transcript from an Iranian TV special on The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Or, for giggles, read this transcript of an Iranian TV show that claims Tom and Jerry (yes, the cat and mouse) was created to bolster sympathy for Jews:

The Jews were degraded and termed "dirty mice." Tom and Jerry was made in order to change the Europeans' perception of mice. One of terms used was "dirty mice"...Tom and Jerry was made in order to display the exact opposite image. If you happen to watch this cartoon tomorrow, bear in mind the points I have just raised, and watch it from this perspective. The mouse is very clever and smart. Everything he does is so cute. He kicks the poor cat's ass. Yet this cruelty does not make you despise the mouse. He looks so nice, and he is so clever... This is exactly why some say it was meant to erase this image of mice from the minds of European children, and to show that the mouse is not dirty and has these traits.

It's amazing, unbelievable and terrifying.

MEMRITV is an amazing site; in my opinion, they should be uploading their videos to YouTube to increase public awareness.

In case you missed it, the documentary will be airing again tonight (Thursday night/Friday morning) at 2AM (if you have a TiVO...) on WETA 26 (in Baltimore) and on Sunday on WHUT 19 at 11PM.

Against Scientific Interpretations of Genesis

From Understanding Genesis, by Nahum Sarna:

It should be obvious that by the nature of things, none of [the creation] stories can possibly be the product of human memory, nor in any modern sense of the word scientific accounts of the origin and nature of the physical world.

Biblical man, despite his undoubted intellectual and spiritual endowments, did not base his views of the universe and its laws on the critical use of empirical data. He had not, as yet, discovered the principles and methods of disciplined inquiry, critical observation or analytical experimentation. Rather, his thinking was imaginative, and his expressions of thought were concrete, pictorial, emotional, and poetic. Hence, it is a naive and futile exercise to attempt to reconcile the biblical accounts of creation with the findings of modern science. Any correspondence which can be discovered or ingeniously established between the two must surely be nothing more than mere coincidence. Even more serious than the inherent fundamental misconception of the psychology of biblical man is the unwholesome effect upon the understanding of the Bible itself. For the net result is self-defeating. The literalistic approach serves to direct attention to those aspects of the narrative that reflect the time and place of its composition, while it tends to obscure the elements that are meaningful and enduring, thus distorting the biblical message and destroying its relevancy.

See also my previous thoughts, somewhat similar but much less eloquently articulated.

Going Au Natural

R. Moshe Taragin spoke a total of five times last Shabbos, and offered many poignant thoughts. One that stuck with me was his explanation of the idol worship known as Baal Peor.

For those of you unaware, the method by which one worshiped the god Peor was by defecating before its idol. R. Taragin explained this as pointing to a worship of the natural. The acolytes of Peor felt that something natural, no matter how revolting, was inherently holy. Defecation, while revolting, is completely natural, and was therefore chosen as their form of worship.

R. Taragin progressed from here to a discussion of humanism, and ultimately settled on the Akeidah and questions of natural or rational morality vs. revealed divine will (most of which can be found in previous posts on this blog).

We'll Have a Gay Old Time

Lots of big news last week, not the least of which was Conservative Judaism's decision on homosexuality. I read through part of the responsum over Shabbos (Canonist has a link); I haven't had time to get all the way through, Josh has done a good job of summarizing it though.

One thing I did notice, the responsum concludes by quoting the following verse (Psalms 149:4-5):

כִּי-רוֹצֶה יְהוָה בְּעַמּוֹ; יְפָאֵר עֲנָוִים, בִּישׁוּעָה. יַעְלְזוּ חֲסִידִים בְּכָבוֹד; יְרַנְּנוּ, עַל-מִשְׁכְּבוֹתָם.

Obviously someone has a sense of humor. ;)

R. Matisyahu Solomon at the Agudah Convention

Canonist has posted an mp3 of R. Matisyahu Solomon's speech at the recent Agudah Convention.

Listen here:

Put On Your Yamuka, It's Time to Celebrate...

This just in from XM Radio:

DC-based XM Satellite Radio, a provider of satellite radio service to more than 7 million subscribers, said on Monday that it will launch a special channel to coincide with the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah. The company said that its "Radio Hanukkah" channel, to air Dec. 15-23, will feature a broad spectrum of Jewish music and conversation.

With a specific focus on the music and traditions that celebrate the festival of Hanukkah, classic and off-the-wall renditions of traditional Hanukkah songs, such as "I Have a Little Dreidel" and "Maoz Tzur," will be showcased on the channel along with nightly broadcasts of the traditional Hanukkah candlelight blessings which will air at the appropriate times in both the Eastern and Pacific time zones.

In addition, Radio Hanukkah will feature specials focused on contemporary and traditional Jewish music, comedy, children's programming and more. Barenaked Ladies, Matisyahu, Al Franken, Kinky Friedman, Neil Sedaka, Dr. Ruth and Larry Miller are among the Jewish celebrities who will be participating in XM's Radio Hanukkah programming.

Oy Gevalt! What's more Jewish than Al Franken (besides Al Sharpton)? I think we should start a pool, here's how it will work: everyone who enters picks a number, and, at the end of the week, whoever's number is closest to the number of times they played Adam Sandler's Channukah Song wins.

Tags: radio, xm radio, judaism, jewish, music, hannukah

Da'as Torah, The Zohar and Other Assorted Thoughts

On The Main Line has a great post on a new journal article by Menachem Kellner entitled Maimonides Agonist: Disenchantment and Reenchantment in Modern Judaism. It's a long post, worth reading, and brought to mind a number of thoughts.

First, the issue of da'as Torah and just how historically normative it is. I'll just add that if you consider the explanation of Genesis that we've been throwing around here (in short: that Adam eating from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil was Man asserting his prerogative to "know" morality by force of his own reason, and so was an inherent rejection of Divine authority) then it's clear that some kind of recognition of rabbinic authority (not necessarily modern-day da'as Torah) must be part and parcel of traditional Judaism.

Regarding the nature of da'as Torah, S. writes:

As far as I can tell that is the innovation of Daas Torah as a prescriptive ideology: the idea that a rabbi who spends the bulk of his time teaching Torah to 20 year bachelors is inherently better suited to practical leadership of the wider community than a rabbi who has street smarts, even if their Torah scholarship is otherwise equal.

Perhaps this is a result of galus, and the lack of a concrete reality in which the halachic reality can be realized. The subsequent focus of learning becomes segregated from the real world, more idealistic than practical or political. Very reminiscent of Halachic Man; and, in contrast, the Shalem Center and the Azure Journal work very hard at countering this perspective by focusing on reacquainting halacha with a political reality (in the Land/State of Israel).

It's interesting to consider the roots of this attitude: one would assume that it is Maimonidean, since it's more rational. But the article Kellner presents posits Maimonides as more practical. I haven't quite puzzled it all out yet.

One last comment: it hadn't occured to me of the import of the debate over the authorship of the Zohar as it pertains the traditional "proof" of the authenticity of the Torah, but it's a perfect example of why that argument falls flat.

The Horror!

S. at OnTheMainLine has a post wondering if the Agudah is up in arms over just the "bad" blogs, or blogs in general. I was rather pleasantly amused that my blog and banner (see above) are used as examples of what might be found objectionable about blogging by the Agudah (the coexistence of Torah and other things; not the things in and of themselves). In the comments, my banner is referred to as "a horror show for the Agudah." That certainly made me smile. ;)

For what it's worth, I think it's an issue of power and authority. I understand the Agudah's concern, although I think they're a bit off as to where that authority shoud reside. And even if they were right, when power is abused, it must be confronted by any means possible.