April 17, 2007

Quantum Inderterminacy Does Not Equal Free Will, Part 2

A few weeks back, I posted my thoughts on why the fact of quantum indeterminacy does not provide grounds (or "wiggle room") for free will. Last night, while perusing one of my favorite books, The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten, I came across #9, entitled, "Bigger Brother" (you have to log in to Amazon to use their reader, the piece is a short three pages). I'm tempted to copy the whole thing, but that would probably be a breach of copyright, so I'll just give you the upshot:

The appeal to quantum indeterminacy won't do. Even if it is true that quantum theory introduces more unpredictability than our thought experiment has allowed, all it would do is replace an entirely predictable causal process with one that contains unpredictable, random elements. But our actions are no more free if they are the result of random causal processes than if they are the result of strictly determined ones. Free will appears to require that we escape the physical causal chain altogether. And that, it seems, we cannot do.

It's basically what I was saying, only clearer. The end result would not be what we're looking for in terms of free will. Instead, we would need to show that, for all intents and purposes, the equivalent of a miracle takes place each time a free choice is made.

Posted by Greg at April 17, 2007 1:33 PM in , | TrackBack
Comments

"But our actions are no more free if they are the result of random causal processes than if they are the result of strictly determined ones."

Well, that's sort of assuming the conclusion then, isn't it? What if our actions are themselves "random causal processes" motivate by free will?

Posted by: Moishe Potemkin at April 19, 2007 1:30 PM