Presence

R. Ezra Bick, via KMTT (Yeshivat Gush Etzion's podcast), is giving a series of shiurim on the Akeidah. ">The first installment addresses the nature of morality through the lens of the Akeidah. It is excellent, I listened to it three times yesterday.

R. Bick uses Euthyphro's Dilemma to explicate the nature of morality (are things Good because God says so, or does God simply command that which is Good). If you recall, I've discussed this before in the context of Genesis, AddeRabbi and I had a lengthy discussion about it in our first podcast as well.

R. Bick delineates three positions, the first two based on Euthyphro's Dilemma:

1. What God says is Good - "good" as an independent ideal is really non-existent, that which is Good is only that which is commanded by God; subsequently, Man has no moral capacity whatsoever. In addition, evil can not be said to exist, since if something is God's will, it is good. Maimonides identifies this as the doctrine of the Ashariya (a group of Muslim philosophers), and, in R. Bick's opinion is antithetical to Judaism.


2. God commands which is Good - the problem here is that, essentially, one has "two gods;" even more so, one could say that God is subservient to the Good. This creates a dualism which is also problematic from a Jewish perspective, since God is subordinate to Good.

The final position, which R. Bick brings from Maimonides, is based on an analysis of the interaction between God and Avraham in Parshas Vayera. When God informs Avraham of His plans to destroy Sodom, Avraham argues, insisting that it would be unjust for God to kill the righteous alongside the wicked. Therefore, we see that Man can discern that which is Good, using his intellect. At the Akeidah, however, Avraham is forced to accept the decree of God despite his moral compass telling him that it is wrong. The resolution is in understanding God as One, therefore, God does not simply convey that which is Good through his commandments, but He is the Good. I'm not sure I fully understand this position, but it would seem to equate the idea of God not with a Being, but with Morality.

I would like to propose an alternate understanding of the events in Vayera, along the same lines. The question here is not whether Man can make moral estimations; we know that he can, as he ate from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. When Avraham challenges God's plan, based on his own moral estimations, what begins is a series of encounters that are meant to teach Avraham that, despite his moral estimations, he must subject them to the Will of God. The culmination of this is the Akeidah. Avraham feels it is immoral, but subjugates his will in order to carry out the Divine command. In other words, it is a given that Man has a moral capacity, the ability to reason that which is Good. But he must learn to deny himself that privilege under certain circumstances (and perhaps trust that God would not cause him to committ an immoral act).

It is intersting to note that, despite Avraham's protestations, nothing really changed. God had decided to destroy Sodom, and Avraham begins bargining based on the number of righteous in the city. In the end, Avraham concedes that Sodom should indeed be destroyed, that it was in fact good to do so. The same is true by the Akeidah; nothing, in the end, immoral was actually perpetrated. This is evidence that Man's moral reasoning is, at the very least, on par with God's. The question becomes one of power and authority, not one of capacity.

One final asmachta to the idea that Man indeed has the capacity to reason morality: in the Talmud, when attempting to discern a precept, we fall back on a verse from the Torah, only if we can not logically deduce the precept. We first appeal to svarah, logic, and only afterwards look to the revealed text for an answer.

I think one thing is clear: I should have gone to Gush. Or, perhaps, I should go to Gush now.